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PART I
Introduction
Human rights and terrorism are two of the most frequently invoked, powerfully
deployed, and hotly contested paradigms of our time. They are, first and foremost,
words. They are words that attempt to describe concepts, values and actions. Human
rights are understood as the fundamental “civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights that all human being should enjoy” beyond the non-negotiable, fundamental right
to life (United Nations). The concept of terrorism seeks to categorize and comprehend
what has been perceived as a uniquely transnational, increasing phenomenon of violent,
ideologically driven attacks targeting civilians. Accordingly, counter-terrorism is
normatively understood to consist of efforts aimed at preventing these types of acts of
violence against civilians, and based off this understanding, is presumed to be an
irrefutable force of good and justice. It is crucial to analyze the social construction of
both of human rights and terrorism, as well as the fields of meaning they encompass, if
we are to understand global differences in their conceptualization and discrepancies in
how they are accepted and actualized.
Investigations into difference and universality are increasingly important during
an era of social and political thought best embodied in Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of
Civilizations” theory 1 . “According to [Huntington’s] conception of international
relations, there are immanent, structural differences between peoples of different
religious backgrounds and cultural origins”, and these fault lines will provide the fodder
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See: Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.
3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 22-49.
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for major and inevitable violent conflict in the 21st century (Gafaïti 102). The powerful
impact of Huntington’s argument, both in policy and civilian consciousnesses, has still
yet to be fully understood or systematically analyzed. It is the position of this author,
however, that Huntington’s thesis homogenizes vastly different groups of people into
cohesive “civilizational” identities that, in reality, do not exist. Furthermore, he
irresponsibly and inaccurately seeks to characterize as elements of time immemorial
conflicts with very specific historical, political, and economic roots.
This paper seeks to explore discursive formations of terror and counter-terrorism
and their impact on human rights in Morocco. I refer to discourse in the Foucauldian
sense of word to account for the mechanisms (verbal, visual, aural) utilized to define and
delimit a particular concept. “Discourses neither antedate nor express some truth or
reality. Instead, they form regularities that emerge and become systematized in and
through the articulation and reiteration of particular norms and practices, not because
they are logical or true but rather because of this regularity” (Berman 47). Discourses
reflect embedded power relations but also serve as sites of contestation and redefinition.
Using both secondary research and qualitative data collected during semi-structured
interviews, I seek to explore the local implications of the universally circulating
discourses of human rights and terrorism and the ways they interact and react within the
Moroccan context. Through the narratives of Moroccan residents themselves (though not
citizens, necessarily), I hope to demonstrate that: 1) Despite arguments to the contrary,
the discourse of human rights is invoked throughout the world in the name of justice and
peace, and encompasses a set of values understood as indigenous within and common
between societies of diverse cultural and religious backgrounds, 2) Terrorism remains a
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disputed discourse, as even those who recognize and condemn the acts of violence it
seeks to describe, also condemn the stereotypes, biases, and developmental logical
embedded within its rhetoric and structure, and 3) If counter-terror efforts are to succeed
in pursuing the principles and objectives implied in the essence of the discourse, they
must be closely monitored. The consequences of policies are mitigated by the specific
characteristics of the countries in which they are implemented, and this must be taken
into account. Counter-terror measures that are exploited to violate human rights will
have grave repercussions, effectively collapsing distinctions between terrorism and
counter-terrorism, terrorist organizations and the “legitimate” forces attempting to
combat them.

Methodology
This paper integrates research from secondary material found in a wide variety of
sources, with firsthand, qualitative information collected in face-to-face interviews. To
find potential contacts, I utilized past lecturers at the Center for Cross Cultural Learning,
the suggestions of my academic directors, extensive online research, and “snowball”
information provided by each interviewee if possible. The intent of this project was not,
however, to conduct a widespread survey of the general population, but to target
individuals in specific professional and educational sectors. A study focused on the
general population, while extremely important and perhaps a project for a future date,
was far beyond my linguistic and financial resources and not possible within such a
limited period of time. Persons initially contacted for thus study included professors,
human rights activists, lawyers, journalists, political party members, Moroccan and
international NGOs, and governmental organizations.
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There were, however, several methodological issues that impeded my ability to
collect a diverse and substantive sample of informants. First and foremost, there was the
main issue of language barriers. The major languages spoken in Morocco are Darija
(Moroccan Arabic) and French. I can speak neither of these languages, and therefore my
access to both Moroccan literature and individuals was severely limited. I acknowledge
and lament this obstacle that absolutely limited my ability to pursue this topic to my ideal
amount of detail or depth. There exists in Morocco a vibrant set of exchanges and
activism regarding terrorism and the consequences of the Casa bombings, but I was only
able to access a very small portion of this wealth of information. Furthermore, while I
did conduct one interview with an interpreter, the skill level of this interpreter was less
than I anticipated, and this inevitably impacted the quality of the exchange that took
place.
Secondly, logistical barriers loomed around every corner. From taxis drivers who
had never heard the streets I tried to find, to the innumerable unanswered phone calls and
emails that left my voicemail and inbox empty, it was extraordinarily difficult to find, in
the very literal sense of the word, people to talk with. Email is not the preferred mode of
communication in Morocco, and often it took weeks, if at all, to receive a response from
a particular organization or individual. Of the 30 some individuals and organizations that
I contacted before and during the timeframe of the project, ten responded. Of those ten,
one was a major organization to which I sent two unanswered emails (one in English and
one in French). Undeterred, I called them directly and the woman I spoke with asked that
I send an email detailing my request. Needless to say, the email went unanswered.
Another potential participant requested that I email him at the end of April, but never
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responded to my follow up e-mail. A third individual, the member of a major human
rights association, did not respond to either email I sent him, but then responded to an
email I sent to another member of his organization. He provided me with his personal
contact information and suggested I call him to set up an appointment. However, upon
my first attempt, he requested that I call back at the end of the day. I complied, but he
did not pick up his phone or respond to my follow-up emails. The majority of the major
organizations I emailed simply did not respond, and one explicitly declined to participate.
In total, I was able to interview six individuals. Three are academics, one is a
refugee currently living in Morocco, one is an artist/writer, and one is on the board of a
non-governmental, human rights advocacy group. For confidentiality reasons, all of their
names have been changed, however, issues of vulnerability were somewhat limited in this
study because the majority of my informants are well established in their fields and their
viewpoints are public and known. One participant in particular who is a sub-Saharan
refugee was concerned about how I attained his contact information because, as he
explained in the email, members of his community and organization have to worry about
police repression and retaliation. Once I explained in further detail who I was and how I
had come across his email address however, he was more than willing to meet with me.

Language and Discourse
September 11th functioned as the semiotic nucleus for the subsequent discursive
explosion of terror and terrorism in the United States’ and broader Western, collective
imagination. The use of terrorism as a paradigm to describe and understand particular
acts of violence far proceeds the tragic events of 9/11. A close examination of its usage
both throughout history and in the present-day context reveals that the meaning of
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terrorism was and continues to be neither fixed nor stable. Today’s understanding of
terrorism has departed quite significantly from its initial deployment describing “French
revolutionary actions against domestic enemies in 1793 and 1794” (Bartolucci 4). Today,
the term is most commonly used in reference to and associated with “‘Islamic terrorism’
and ‘Islamic radicalism’, and since 2001… with the Al-Qaida network” (Bartolucci 7)
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR), in its extensive report “Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Human Rights”
begins with the caveat that “The debate over the causes of terrorism is hampered by a
lack of a universally accepted definition” (5). Following this acknowledgment, the
OHCHR then proceeds to define terrorism as “acts of violence that target civilians in the
pursuit of political or ideological aims” (5). It acknowledges that while “in legal terms,
although the international community has yet to adopt a comprehensive definition of
terrorism, existing declarations, resolutions and universal ‘sectoral’ treaties relating to
specific aspects of it define certain acts and core elements” (OHCHR 5). Francis Y.
Owusu offers a similar but more comprehensive definition of the term in his paper “Post9/11 U.S. Foreign Aid, the Millennium Challenge Account, and Africa: How Many Birds
Can One Stone Kill?” Owusu defines “terrorism as the calculated use of violence or
threat of violence against civilians in order to attain goals that are political, religious, or
ideological, through the use of intimidation, coercion, or the instilling of fear” (6).
On December 10th, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, (UDHR) and this document, “together with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols, and
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the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, form the so - called
International Bill of Human Rights” (United Nations). The OHCHR asserts that
“The full spectrum of human rights involves respect for, and protection and fulfillment
of, civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, as well as the right to
development. Human rights are universal— in other words, they belong inherently to all
human beings—and are interdependent and indivisible” (4). Articulating what exactly
these values consist of and determining the strength and extent of the legal guarantees
developed for their promotion and protection have remained difficult issues with tenuous,
if any, international consensus in either theory or practice. Clearly, though, as one of the
foundational documents of the young U.N., advocacy for the inviolable sanctity of human
rights has an established history within the context of international governing bodies.
Furthermore, the concept of human rights has been articulated in religious and secular
philosophical traditions throughout history, ancient and modern. Issues of origins and
implementation aside, for the purpose of this paper I will employ the definition offered
above by the OHCHR. To argue persuasively for the undeniable universality of human
rights, we must examine how these principles and the language with which they are
articulated interact with innumerable local contexts of diverse political systems, cultural
values, gender norms and (in)equalities, levels of economic development, and religious,
ethnic, and racial identities.
Between human rights and terrorism there exists a “complex and multifaceted
relationship” (OHCHR 2). As their meanings are neither fixed nor stable, exploring the
ways in which these words have been utilized and appropriated by various regimes and
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actors, and the resulting consequences for civilian populations and states alike, reveals
their core ambiguities. Clearly,
“Terrorism clearly has a very real and direct impact on human rights, with
devastating consequences for the enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and
physical integrity of victims. In addition to these individual costs,
terrorism can destabilize governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize
peace and security, and threaten social and economic development”
(OHCHR 1).
Since September 11th and its profound impact on U.S. foreign policy, with resulting
reverberations across the globe, “the measures adopted by States to counter terrorism
have themselves often posed serious challenges to human rights and the rule of law”
(OHCHR 1). Thus, while terrorism itself clearly undermines all of the liberties enshrined
within human rights doctrine, counter-terrorism has emerged, at least in practice, less as a
strategy to counteract the injustices of terrorism and more as the other side of the same
coin. The implications of this perversion of justice are troubling. Former General
Secretary to the U.N. Kofi Annan eloquently summarizes the dangerous consequences of
such a situation, cautioning that “to pursue security at the expense of human rights is
short-sighted, self contradictory, and, in the long run, self-defeating” (HRW Evil 4).

PART II
Morocco: A brief overview
The Kingdom of Morocco’s “strategic location has shaped its history” (State
Department). Located at the crossroads of present-day Africa, Europe, and the Middle
East, it has always been a country of human mobility, cultural interface, and intellectual
intersections. In the 7th century Arab invaders conquered the indigenous, largely Berber
population, bringing with them Sunni Islam. Today, Morocco is approximately 99%
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Muslim and identifies with the Maliki school of jurisprudence. The country is ruled by
the Alaouite dynasty, which acceded to the throne in 1649. The ruling family claims
descent from the Prophet Muhammad, and the King is both “Commander in Chief of the
military and holds the title of Amir al-Mou’minin, or Commander of the Faithful, the
country's religious leader” (CIA/State Department). Morocco is a constitutional
monarchy that, as mandated by 1996 revisions to its then-25 year old constitution, created
a bicameral parliament legislature.
“The Moroccan Constitution provides for a strong monarchy, but a weak
Parliament and judicial branch. Dominant authority rests with the King.
The King presides over the Council of Ministers; appoints the Prime
Minister following legislative elections; appoints all members of the
government taking into account the Prime Minister's recommendations;
and may, at his discretion, terminate the tenure of any minister, dissolve
the Parliament, call for new elections, or rule by decree” (State
Department).
The degree to which the monarchy enjoys popular legitimacy is debated both within
academic and popular circles. Professor Jack Kalpakian notes that, “unlike other Arab or
Muslim monarchies, the Moroccan monarchy was established over a thousand years ago,
with the current dynasty ruling for more than three hundred years… the extent of [its]
legitimacy can be disputed, but its existence should not be discounted” (Tug-of-War
120). On the other hand, John P. Entelis, a well-established scholar on Maghreb
countries, argues that
“the North African state can better be understood as ‘fierce’ since, in order
to preserve itself, it resorts to the use of raw power as its default function.
It is not ‘strong,’ because the Maghrib state ‘lacks the infrastructural
power that enables [it] to penetrate society effectively through
mechanisms such as taxation. [It also] lacks ideological hegemony (in a
Gramscian sense) that would enable it to forge a historic social bloc that
accepts the legitimacy of the ruling stratum" (543).
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Based on informal observation and discussion, this author is inclined to agree more with
Kalpakian’s argument, but as within all countries, the spectrum of affiliation/opposition
is wide and varied, and generalizations are somewhat difficult to make. However,
especially in comparison to his father, it appears that large segments of the Moroccan
population are at least nominally satisfied with Mohammed VI, if not quite content, and
do not feel any pressing desire for fundamental changes in government.
The social development of Morocco has been uneven, with rural and northern
areas lagging behind urban locales and the Southern regions. The literacy level
(definition--age 15 and over can read and write) of the total population stands at 52.3%.
The gender breakdown reveals severe gender-based inequality, with the male literacy rate
standing at 65.7% and the female literacy rate at a mere 39.6% according to the 2004
census (CIA). In rural areas, furthermore, the female literacy rate in estimated to stand at
no more than 10% (State Department.). The Moroccan workforce consists of ~ 11.5
million persons according to 2008 estimates, and unemployment stands at 9.9 % (CIA).
The 2005-2007 Euromed Partnership report on Morocco characterizes
“The social situation [as] worrying. The unemployment rate in cities is
over 20% (notably among the young and females), poverty has been on
the rise since the 1990s, and there are still marked disparities in access to
basic services (water, electricity, housing, education and health). These
disparities are even more notable when female access to these services
(particularly education) are considered” (2).
However, Morocco is generally recognized to be far more liberal than the majority of
MENA states, with slowly increasing levels of governmental transparency, civil society
development, and human development.
Islam is indivisible from politics in Morocco in the same way that it is indivisible
from social and cultural rituals and the mundane activities of everyday life. It is built into
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Moroccan speech, dress, celebration, mourning, and even architecture. While “the proper
role of religion in the polity is an issue for debate… that the two should be linked is not”
(Kalpakian 133). The king himself occupies the position of Commander of the Faithful,
and part of the ruling family’s claim on its legitimacy to govern is based on their descent
from the line of the Prophet. Islam has also been instrumentalized by opposition political
parties, to call for political and social reform, and:
“There are three main types of Islamist movements in Morocco. First,
there are movements that work within the government… There are also
those outside the political mainstream… This second group includes both
violent and non-violent political movements… A third movement holds
that Islam, in its most fundamental form, is a personal choice and eschews
politics altogether” (Kalpakian 125).
Of the politically active Islamist organizations, the most mainstream within the system is
that of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which has “cultivated a loyal
grassroots base by attacking government corruption, trumpeting democracy as a
challenge to the autocratic executive, and providing local constituent services” (Wittes &
McFaul 22). The 2007 parliamentary elections reflected upon “The slow, partial
democratization that appears to be underway in monarchical Morocco… [and] stands as a
unique experiment, one that so far has been yielding results notable different from those
seen in other parts of the Arab world” (Wittes & McFaul 20). Perhaps most significantly,
while the PJD won a sizeable number of seats, it was not overwhelmingly voted into the
majority as analysts expected. Also of extreme importance and concern in considering
these elections, however, were the very low turnout rates estimated to be at 37%, with 1/5
of those ballots intentionally spoiled (Wittes&McFaul 21). That being said, Wittes and
McFaul emphasize that
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“all Islamist parties are not the same… [and] the PJD’s participation in
elections and Parliament seems to have had a moderating effect on the
party’s orientation, and has spurred important intraparty debates over how
to balance Islamist political principles, opposition tactics, and democratic
values” (20).
When considering Islamism in Morocco, these testaments to its diversity and dynamism
are important to keep in mind. On the other hand, as Smith and Loudiy note,
“Islamists also equivocate when asked how they would maintain speech
and other liberties if they were to gain more power. Islam, as moderate
Islamists tend to see it, is incompatible with the exercise of [certain]
liberties which human rights advocates and other pro-democracy Muslim
dissidents consider universal” (1088).
Regardless, when discussing the treatment of Islamists by the government and allegations
of radicalism and terrorism, it is important to note that just as in Islam itself, Islamist
parties and agendas in Morocco are by no means uniform, and “the monarchy has not
attempted to encourage dissent between Islamists because they have been and remain
deeply divided, even within the PJD” (Kalpakian 133)

The Bombings
On May 16th, 2003, “in the most devastating such attack in Morocco, twelve
suicide bombers struck five locations in Casablanca — a large hotel, two restaurants, a
Jewish civic association, and the Jewish cemetery in the old city. The attacks killed
thirty-three people in addition to the bombers and injured more than one hundred” (HRW
Crossroads 25). Subsequent investigation revealed that “There was no initial plan to
attack the Jewish cemetery, and it was attacked as a target of opportunity by a terrorist
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who had failed at another location” (Kalpakian Human Bomb 116). All 14 2 bombers
were from shantytowns on the outskirts of Casa Blanca, in particular Sidi Moumen,
Carriere Thomas, and Thomasville (CPT). All were members of a violent minority
Islamist group most commonly referred as al-Salifiya al-Jihadiya, although subsequent
research confirms that “the recruits were unaware of organization they had become active
in, and it’s actual name” (Kalpakian 115). While the Center for Policing Terrorism
(CPT) reports that “The attacks bore many al-Qaeda hallmarks: multiple, simultaneous
attacks; suicide assailants; and lightly defended targets,” the actual nature of the
bombers’ affiliation with al-Qaeda remains contested, an issue that came up within my
fieldwork. As Participant A put it, “I really have the feeling it was local initiative and
they knew that they would be affiliated with Al-Qaeda.” Kalpakian asserts that,
“This movement/organization is not in a hierarchical relationship with alQaeda. Instead, the appropriate terminology here is that they were its
‘fellow travelers’… The al-Qaeda brand has been applied to what is in fact
a local product, which initially appears impressive” (120).
A similar point was expressed by Participant A, who noted to the poor organization,
failed execution, high death toll of Moroccans and comparatively low death toll of
Westerners (~4:1), and surmised “al-Qaeda is responsible for 9/11? Al-Qaeda is
responsible for this? No, I don’t think it’s the same organization.”

Government Reaction
The Moroccan government reacted swiftly and forcefully to the attacks. As one
of my informants pointed out, one of the most important aspects of the bombings, from

An interesting reflection of journalistic responsibility, the published sources on
the logistics of the bombing vary with regard to number of bombers, number of
deaths, and targets!

2
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the perspective of the State was how “it took the regime by surprise because the king is
‘supposedly’ the commander of the faithful. This mythology was broken.” One
immediate repercussion was the dismissal of the Minister of Religious Affairs, who had
occupied his position for 18 years, and according to one my informants “was known for
his sympathy with more radical Islamist forces.” Dr. Ahmed Taufiq, “known for his Sufi
preferences and membership in the Boutchaychiya Brotherhood,” was enlisted to fill the
position a vigorous campaign of religious standardization was embarked upon (Kalpakian
Tug-of-War 130). Within the judicial realm, “On May 29, 2003, less than two weeks
after the Casablanca bombings, the Moroccan parliament, in a special session, passed the
Law to Combat Terror (Bill 03.03). The bill had been pending before the parliament
through the winter session” (Human Rights Watch 26).
Before going into the specifics of Bill 3.03, it is worthwhile to explain some of
most salient features of the Moroccan legal system. Morocco’s current judicial structures
were developed during French colonial rule and remain modeled after the French system.
“A challenge for each Moroccan monarch has been the postcolonial legal system”
(Slyomovics 13). Of central importance within its judicial structure is “the Code of Penal
Procedure (CPP), a compilation of rules governing police investigations, prosecution,
remedies to the law, and evidence” (Slyomovics 14). Of particular importance in
understanding how abuses of human rights occur within the framework of this system is
the concept of garde à vue. Here I will quote Slyomovics at length:
“Garde à vue refers to the period during which the suspect spends in
detention while a police inquiry is undertaken, but before he or she is
charged with a crime and brought to trial…English language human rights
reports gloss garde à vue as incommunicado detention. The translation
itself defines an inherently illegal procedure according to
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Anglo-American procedures: to be held incommunicado circumvents
provisions of habeas corpus” (14).
The duration of the legal period of garde à vue has fluctuated over time, but “since the
events of September 11th and the passage of the USA Patriot Act, Morocco has increased
[this] amount” (Slyomovics 16). The Law to Combat Terror has further extended the
legally permissible length of garde à vue, and is discussed in further detail below. Also
of note, “Morocco’s Penal Code does not include a definition of torture which is fully
consistent with the provisions of Convention against Torture” (HRW 38). Furthermore:
“Morocco is among the few states that declared, in accordance with
Article 28 of the Convention against Torture, that they did not recognize
the competence of the U.N. Committee against Torture under the
Convention’s Article 20 to conduct confidential investigations. Morocco
also does not recognize the competence of CAT under Article 22 of the
Convention to consider individual complaints” (HRW 38,39).
Taking into consideration the past history of abuses facilitated by this legal system, Bill
3.03 compounds and intensifies the possibilities of rights abuses that, while forbidden by
international human rights laws, remain ambiguously (il)legal within the current domestic
framework.
In its 2004 report “Morocco: Human Rights at a Crossroads,” the authors report
that one of the most problematic aspects of the bill is that it
“introduced a broad definition of terrorism. A list of specific acts can be
classified as terrorist when they ‘are deliberately perpetuated by an
individual, group or organization, where the main objective is to disrupt
public order by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror.’ The list of
acts includes theft, extortion, and the “promulgation and dissemination of
propaganda or advertisement in support of such acts.” This definition of
terrorism has been applied to convict and imprison journalists who “incite
violence” (HRW 26).
One of the bill’s most dangerous features is the extension it allows on the period of garde
à vue for cases deemed to be relating to terrorism. “The United Nations Commission on
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Human Rights has stated that, “prolonged incommunicado detention may facilitate the
perpetration of torture and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or even torture” (HRW 30). Bill 3.03, however, permits the period of
incommunicado detention to be “increased from eight to twelve days…. before [the
suspect must me] brought before the investigative judge. It also allows the judicial police,
with the prosecutor’s approval, to prevent suspects being investigated from meeting with
their lawyers for up to ten days” (HRW 27). Such an extreme extension of garde à vue,
as well as “Twelve days of detention without judicial review, constitute a violation of
Morocco’s obligations under… The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”
(HRW 32). Islamist suspects arrested in the aftermath of the Casablanca bombings have
reported incidents of torture, secret detention 3 .

III Perspectives from the Field
In this section I have thematically organized the major issues that emerged out of
my fieldwork. I have chosen to proceed thematically in order to highlight consensus in
and conflicts of opinion regarding various major issues discussed in my interviews. The
major foci are as follows: the global and the local, causes of radicalization, Bill 3.03 and
the justice system, the discourse of terrorism, the universality of human rights.
The individuals who participated in this project expressed an acute sense of the
inextricable interplay between local and global forces in accounting for both the causes
and consequences of the Casa bombings. Almost all the participants began by explaining
the immediate effects of the attacks. The most commonly used words were “trauma” and
“shock”. A described the bombings as “a national trauma [that] changed our perception
of self and other… and who the Other can be. B reinforced this claim, explaining that “it
See: Amnesty International (2004) “Torture in the “anti-terrorism” campaign – the case
of Témara detention centre”.
3
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was never expected. A big shock.” While, needless to say, terrorism was by no means an
alien concept or an unheard of phenomenon, there existed in Morocco “a Moroccan
exceptionalism, a sense that these things simply don’t happen here. In many ways it was
an accurate exceptionalism, but one that was shattered on 5/17/03” (C).
What immediately followed the bombings, in both civil society and at the state
level, was “dissent and discourse: what is Islam and its place?” (C). Competing forces
sought to identify the causes of the attacks based on their particular ideological
perspectives: “blame [was] placed on Saudi Arabia by traditionalists, ignorance by
liberals, poverty by Marxists; there was a hijacking of this issue of terrorism” (C). The
extreme politicization of the bombings reflected the many fault lines of identity in
Morocco society. In particular, “A certain elite/intellectual/Francophone segment
[began] publishing strong attacks on Islamism if not Islam itself” (A). It was uniformly
asserted by my participants that an undue and simplistic burden of blame was placed
upon Islamism and in some cases, on Islam as well. One participant recalled how,
following the bombings, an article in L’Economiste was published suggesting that the
private sector should refuse to hire veiled women. B emphasized the dangerous irony of
such an approach in a Muslim country when, globally, “there is already this confusion of
Muslim = terrorist. They have co-opted this for their own political reasons without
understanding the danger of the discourse.”
The bombings and the subsequent mass arrests and investigations left “people…
frightened. We had never seen such violence, especially in civil society… and then the
arrests, barriers for cars… it created a sense of terror for civilian Moroccans.” Entelis,
argues that if the systems of structural violence in Maghreb states are to be overcome, “it
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must begin with political change in the Maghrib itself” (Entelis 539). One of my
respondents pointed to the fact that even in the immediate aftermath of the bombings, the
mass mobilization of the remained fragmented and the demographics of the two rallies
that took place in Casa and Rabat reflected more than geographical divides. Currently,
“there is no organized or sustained form of protest against the current state of public
liberties, nor is there sustained advocacy for a constitutional amendment in this area”
even though the repressive nature of the post-2003 period has been internationally
acknowledged (Smith & Loudiy 34). In this vein, one of my participants strongly
rejected the impulse to point the finger of blame “outward” onto foreign radicalizing
influences. With regards to those who alleged that an increasing Saudi Arabian Wahhabi
influence was to blame, he retorted “Wahhabism is like Marxism at Yale; it’s been
present here since the 19th century.” He continued by postulating that while some of the
bombers’ inspirational figures may have been affiliated with the Wahhabi movement, the
Moroccan bombers themselves were “not necessarily ideologically or jurisprudentially
Wahhabi.” At the same time however, it cannot be denied and must be accounted for that
the bombers themselves and the conditions of poverty that characterized the communities
in which they lived, are linked to transnational communities and global forces.
As noted earlier, Entelis characterizes Morocco as a “fierce state”. The country’s
"fierce" attributes are “reinforced by its rentier status that enables the country's fiscal
health to remain disconnected from society's productive economic forces yet directly tied
to the international political economy” (543). The of disconnect between the government
and the population was reiterated by participant E, who commented that, “the state
doesn’t do much really to solve poverty… the state can do a lot. We have the money.
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But there is corruption and dilapidation of public funds.” Many scholars and
policymakers emphasize how “The growth of nationalist and global jihadism has been
greatly facilitated by Moroccan and Algerian extremist communities operating in Europe.
They provide money; recruit, indoctrinate, and train potential terrorists; and give
supporting logistical services and shelter to terrorist organizations (Celso 84). My
participants, however, pointed first and foremost to internal dynamics and conditions as
both explanatory factors of the bombings and as the greatest threats to Morocco’s future
security. In “Post-9/11 U.S. Foreign Aid, the Millennium Challenge Account, and
Africa: How Many Birds Can One Stone Kill?”, Owusu discusses the concern over the
“increasing securitization of Africa — which has resulted from viewing the continent
through the terrorism lens” (18). Informant E in particular articulated concern over the
effects of this securitization: “if you don’t have something to fight… you create it. This
isn’t to deny its [terrorism’s] existence, but it makes it much bigger so as to justify arms
securitization instead of promoting peace, justice, tolerance, and dialogue between
religions and cultures.”
All of my participants were extremely engaged in offering their views on how and
why radicalization occurs, immediately affirming the observation emphasized by Owusu
that “few of the world’s well-known terrorist groups in recent years have been rooted in
poverty or have had the goal of its elimination” (9). Informant A asserted
“NO. I really don’t think we have that exclusivity. Look at sub-Saharan
Africa… it [their poverty] is not even comparable. People aren’t dying of
hunger [in Morocco]. They’re not starving in the shantytowns. But subSaharans aren’t radicalizing. How come they don’t commit suicide acts of
terror? There must be other reasons.”
Echoing these sentiments, participant C remarked,
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“I’m very suspicious of the poverty thesis. The poorer Moroccans get, the
more liberal they are! The poor are more interesting in de-othering you
than the middle and upper classes. The poorest people are not represented
in these bombings…Radicalization is not an act of empathizing with the
poor.”
Participant B suggested that “it’s not because of poverty. It’s about marginalization,
integration, and frustration.” This belief was supported by A’s analysis that suicide
bombings represent “a performance, a show… they [the bombers] came from
shantytowns. They were people who did not ‘exist’. They had no visibility. So then, in
this bombing, they could be. They were the stars.”
Lack of education and employment were perceived to be two of the critical
factors that facilitated the radicalization of the Casa bombers in particular. More
generally speaking, lack of education, in a broader sense of the word than mere literacy,
was also stressed as a serious problem and a major cause of the spread of radical Islam.
Scholars such as Mohamed El-Khawas argue that neither of these factors can account for
radicalization: “Within these countries, the Islamists are the only organized, wellresourced groups that offer options for change. Their messages have been finding
receptive audience among restless youth—rich and poor, educated and uneducated
alike” (my emphasis). El-Khawas does not, however, specify what then can account for
the appeal of the Islamist message. Participant F claimed that “terrorism starts with
religion – the misinterpretation of religion. You misconstrue things in your mind and
find others of like persuasion.” It is important to note here that participant F was a
Christian refugee from sub-Saharan Africa who asserted that “Muslim logic is different”
and also identified religious difference as one of the main points of conflict between subSaharans and Moroccans.
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Two of my other participants, both Moroccan Muslims, stressed the importance of
being able to read the Qur’an and fiqh, as well as having access to critical interpretations
of these texts. Participant A concluded his response to the question of radicalization by
stressing that it came down to issues of “ideology. I really believe it has to do with
ideology…If you use poverty in another meaning of the word. In terms of education –
yes. More than 50% of the population is illiterate. If people are illiterate… among that
population it’s easier to mislead and manipulate [them]… They cannot read the Qur’an.”
Likewise, participant E, while acknowledging poverty, unemployment, and social
exclusion, emphasized that the most likely targets for fundamentalists are the “young
people who are, above all, illiterate.” Participant C struck a balance, summarizing that,
“when we analyze social or political phenomenon, we need to avoid determinism. We
cannot deny that they come from the most marginalized sectors of Casa, but to explain
[their actions] only through economics, that [would be to look through] a tunnel.”
The OHCHR states that, “The important objective of countering terrorism is often
used as a pretext to broaden State powers in other areas. Offences which are not acts of
terrorism, regardless of how serious they are, should not be the subject of counterterrorist legislation” (24). Many of my participants identified Bill 3.03’s problematically
broad redefinition of terrorism as being one of its major flaws. They also cited the
expansive search powers given to law enforcement officials as frightening and too farreaching. One participant, an expert in law, exclaimed that “it [the law] has to be
changed. Certain articles, it’s too much!” Another echoed this sentiment. “In my
opinion we don’t need this law. In our criminal law we have enough heavy sentences.”
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With the memories of severe government repression under King Hassan II still raw and
unresolved in the public consciousness, the possibilities of torture and disappearance due
to provisions of Bill 3.03 were identified as of grave concern. “The prohibition of torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute under
international law. It is a peremptory norm—or a norm of jus cogens—and is nonderogable even in states of emergency threatening the life of the nation under
international and regional human rights treaties” (OHCHR 32). However, as discussed in
previous sections, allegations of torture, secret detention, and police brutality have all
been made by Islamists detained under the law, and many of their allegations have been
confirmed by both domestic and international NGOs and human rights watchdog groups.
As participant E, the member of a major Moroccan rights association explained, “even if
we [at NGO] don’t share their [Islamist] ideas, we are obliged to advocate for fair trials
and freedom from torture”.
Participant D voiced the opinion that talking about the specifics of the law was
somewhat pointless given the overarching structure of the Moroccan legal system.
“Whatever who we are, we need a legal system that is independent.” Participant E
suggested that the law was passed largely as a statement, both to the international
community and to Moroccan civilians, “to give a clear message that the state is in
control.” Not all of my participants, however shared the same view. Participant C
offered the following assessment: “The law is a good law. It addressed some of the
security concerns but didn’t go off the deep end… it’s procedural enough that it’s not
anything goes. It’s a reasonable amount of due process.” However, he added the caveat
that “it must be thought of as a temporary law” to address the current security threats
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posed by terrorist groups. “If the law is still on the books in 2020, then I think things
need to be reconsidered.”
My participants engaged with the concept of terrorism in diverse ways. While
some uncritically accepted the discourse, others questioned its functionality as an
effective paradigm through which to understand acts of violence. Almost all of the
participants acknowledged and passionately critiqued the implicit association between
terrorism and Islam and terrorist and Muslim in dominant Western discourse. They
identified the discourse’s undercurrents of ethnocentrism, Orientalism, and essentialism
as serious flaws in its potential for international legitimacy. Participant A highlighted the
role of the media and visual mediums of communication in delimiting what terrorism
means and looks like. When asked what first came to mind upon hearing the word
terrorism, he responded “It’s images, of course. Had you asked this before 9/11 my
answer would be different. It’s the Twin Towers – not just in the states. These images
have been broadcasted over and over. We are shaped and limited by this image even
though so many others since have not looked like that.” Participant D took a much more
critical approach, arguing that “already to speak about terrorism is to be situated within a
particular discourse. So, I try to avoid this concept altogether and speak about violence,
acts of violence which can be perpetuated by many actors, state as much as non-state.”
Interestingly enough, participant C emphasized to the contrary his belief that “other
words for state-terrorism and other concepts can be applied. I’m not friendly to the idea
that everything can be understood as terrorism. There are other words for state atrocities,
like crimes against humanity.”
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My participants uniformly denied the validity of arguments alleging that human
rights are a Western concept or an imperialist discourse (which is not to say that they
have never been instrumentalized in neo-imperialist policies and projects). Participant F,
a refugee from sub-Saharan Africa, sitting on Mohammed V Avenue in Rabat,
immediately referenced the Geneva convention when asked to define human rights.
Participant E explained that the mission of the NGO he represents, a Moroccan NGO
active for almost three decades in civil society and activism, was the “defense and
promotion of human rights in their globality and universality.” Participant C scoffed at
the notion of human rights as non-universal in their values and principles. “That’s BS.
It’s something I’ve had to grapple with here. There is plenty of protection of human
rights within Islam. It’s sheer, utter nonsense. The same people raising [this claim] are
often the first to cry for it when they’re taken away.” Participant B offered an interesting
analysis, explaining that resistance to the idea of universal human rights on the part
certain actors stemmed from “a certain confusion about human rights with certain
Western rights such as homosexuality or sexual relations outside marriage.” I think this
analysis offers an interesting example of how deeply internalized the idea of a
civilizational “West” remains within our conceptual and verbal framework. Furthermore,
it reveals problematic possibilities for relativistic arguments in the realm of women’s and
sexual rights 4 . These issues, however, remain outside the specific scope of this paper and
cannot be addressed now.

For an interesting discussion of sexuality, sexuality, and diversity from an Islamic
perspective, see Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle (2003) “Sexuality, Diversity, and Ethics in
the Agenda of Progressive Muslims” Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and
Pluralism Oxford: 190-233.
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PART IV
Connections and Reflections
Within Western scholarship there exists a long and insidious tradition of seeking
to explain the condition of the Other through lenses of ethnocentric cultural and
psychological analysis while remaining obstinately and curiously blind towards structural
factors and historical context. Today, “Despite the current appeal of culturally-based
explanations for the authoritarian impulse [in Maghreb states], most analysts privilege
more complex dynamics involving economic growth and stagnation, social-structural
transformation, state formation and institutional inertia, and ideological transformation"
(Entelis 541). However, even within the secondary sources utilized by this author, a
“psychologizing” of the subaltern appeared within several of the texts. For example,
Celso posits that the radicalization of North African emigrants in Europe is due in part to
“present conflicts [that] invite feelings of past colonial humiliation and shame that can be
righted by violent retaliation” (88). He fails to account for, however, the individual and
institutional forms racism and economic deprivation that many Maghrebi emigrants
confront while in Europe, and minimizes the impact of the brutal forms of physical and
structural violence inflicted by colonial regimes worldwide and their enduring social and
economic consequences. Furthermore, he temporally displaces the subaltern subject (a
well explored mechanism within Orientalist literature), implying that the North African
emigrant always carries upon his/her back and at the forefront of his/her consciousness
“feelings of past colonial humiliation and shame” rather than cohabitating the temporal
present like the Western Europeans around him/her.
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All of my informants expressed apprehension over the racist, ethnocentric, and
Islamophobic currents sensed in the current international discourse of terrorism. They
stressed that these biases undermine the validity of the counter-terror project in its
entirety and obscure its fundamentally universal objectives of protecting life and liberty.
They also stressed a point made by Gafaïti in his article “Hyperculturization” after
September 11: The Arab-Muslim World and the West” that
“Arab and Muslim societies have experienced modernity, including
secularism and critical thinking. Significantly, this large and very
important counter-current in the somewhat traditional societies of the
Middle East and North Africa is to a large extent ignored—passively or
voluntarily—by both Western scholarship and the Western media” (101).
The perceived anti-Islamic agenda of Western foreign policy, and within the War on
Terror in particular, remains one of the global counter-terror effort’s biggest obstacles.
Within the Moroccan context in particular, counter-terror laws are regarded as
mechanisms of state control and an example of the international community’s hypocrisy
and ignorance towards the actual effects of counterterrorism within a particular domestic
context. Perhaps one of the biggest struggles for Western governments and peoples will
be accepting “an understanding of subjectivity, alterity, politics and hermeneutics that is
no longer grounded in the Enlightenment prejudice against religion, nor in the theories of
secularization that predicted the disappearance of religion in the process of rationalization
understood as the essence of liberal modernity” (Gandolfo 331).
My participants identified education as one of most effective strategies for
countering radicalization, as well as being a critical component of any larger foreign
policy efforts to improve relationships between the Arab/Muslim and Western worlds.
Gafaïti argues that:
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“one needs to go beyond Said’s notion of a “natural” ignorance among
entities separated by geography, history, and cultural spaces. Indeed, and
unfortunately, this mutual ignorance is not a given. In fact, it is
constructed and institutionalized. Thus we are bound to face
“institutionalized ignorance”—that is, an epistemological system, a state
and its institutions that intentionally and systematically produce
misrepresentations of the Other in a discourse whose objective is to
maintain its citizens’ ignorance about the rest of the world” (104).
Along this vein, Participant E repeatedly stressed that he believes Barack Obama must
“work with local media in the USA to change the image of Muslims and to promote
dialogue”. Many participants pointed to U.S. media as a major problem and an example
of Gafaïti ’s idea of “institutionalized ignorance”. However, acts of misrepresentation
and otherizing are not only committed by “Western” actors and institutions. Mechanisms
and methods of Occidentalism and self-Orientalism remain curiously understudied,
perhaps out of a misplaced and inaccurate sense of political correctness. As participant C
explains, “in the perception of Arabs/Muslims it’s ALL Americans, not just the
administration” [making violent policies, targeting Muslims, etc.]. Said himself, in his
piece entitled “The Alternative United States”
“shows that the history, society, and culture of the American nation should
not be identified with the hegemonic policies of its capitalist trusts, special
interest groups, and belligerent governments. He criticizes Arab-Muslims
for their nearly total absence of knowledge of the multifaceted reality of
the people, movements, organizations, political spectrum, and
sociocultural richness of the United States” (Gafaïti100).
De-otherizing, accurate representations of the diversity and heterogeneity between and
within defined social groups demands the involvement and creative collaboration of
engaged citizens and governments worldwide.
The United States has responded with carrots, rather than sticks, to the Moroccan
State’s efforts to combat terrorism and its more or less steadfast support of the Bush
Administration’s War on Terror policies (with the exception that it refused to support an
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invasion of Iraq without a U.N. resolution). The Bush administration’s silence, however,
on the well-documented abuses of human rights, particularly of widespread arrests,
violations of due process, and torture, has not gone unnoticed. Perhaps reflective of the
administration’s own horrific ambivalence towards the use of torture (as evidenced by the
recent release of Department of Justice memos on the subject, as ordered by President
Obama), this series of connections has negatively impacted perceptions of the United
States in its entirety and of the validity of “counter-terrorism”. That being said, my
participants conveyed a sense of cautious optimism regarding the future of counterterrorism and human rights issues in both the United States and Morocco, especially with
the arrival of new president who has provided an iconic new face and has already made
important policy reversals. All participants articulated the opinion that the United States
could and should have a major role in international affairs (or perhaps this was more a
realistic resignation that it will). In order for the United States’ impact to be a positive
one, however, its policies must take into greater account actual, on-the-ground
implications for countries with different political systems, economic issues, religious and
cultural norms, and historically contextual, embedded systems of structural violence.
My interviewees criticized the unrealistically significant place that superficial
understandings of “terrorism” and “count-terrorism” occupy in U.S. foreign policy. All
were uncomfortable with the idea that poverty relief was increasingly conceptualized “as
a tool… for combating global poverty, not only for its own good, but also as part of the
“war on terrorism” (Owusu 5). As their comments suggest and many scholars argue,
linking poverty and terrorism in any reductive manner facilitates a one-dimensional,,
homogenizing, and reductive understanding of why acts of terror occur and the
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conditions that enable their rationalization. “The challenges facing many poor people
around the world, and especially Africa’s poor who do not pose a direct terrorist threat,
are being ignored” (Owusu 1). In country like Morocco, with extreme but very unevenly
distributed poverty, and a historically moderate and tolerant form indigenous form of
Islam, this poses a serious concern. Furthermore, such a policy risks creating a selffulfilling prophecy. Truly neglected and underserved areas deemed unimportant to
security concerns, and therefore secondary on the aid agenda, could, in fact, radicalize
around violent ideology as a response to this neglect.
One of the sentiments repeated over and over was the sense of injustice regarding
how “After 11 September, American policy makers suddenly decided that much of
the world’s trouble came from political Islam, forgetting that the United States
had a role in its rise during the past two decades” (El-Khawas 181). Nowhere was this
articulated more clearly than with reference to Afghanistan. As participant D stressed,
“do not try to use violent Islamists as an International Relations tool. There is a constant
temptation to use these people as weapons against the enemies of the US… in many parts
of the world, communism is not the worst thing that could happen. Get to know Leftists.
Afghanistan should never happen again.” The situation in Afghanistan was commonly
identified as one of the gravest and most tragic unresolved injustices in recent history – a
situation for which the United States is directly responsible. I believe, based off the
conversations I have had during the course of this project, as well outside focus on this
issue throughout my academic career, that a public, honest, admission of accountability
for the current situation in Afghanistan, and a comprehensive commitment to peace and
rebuilding, on Afghan terms, more than anything else, could restore significant credibility
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and respect to the United States. As of yet, no sufficient acknowledgment has been made
regarding the U.S. role in facilitating the continued impoverishment, violence, and novel
forms of radicalization that the Afghanistan population has been subjected to. The 1980s
C.I.A operations in which millions were spent funneling arms through Pakistan’s secret
service agency to Afghan radicals fighting the Soviets remains far too untouched in
critical public discourse.
My participants expressed dismay and frustration at the United States’ gall to
champion democracy and punish certain regimes for the inability to follow suite, yet at
the same time undertake policies and relationships directly contradicting the democratic
ideal. As participant D stated “Be consistent; if you are speaking the language of a
democratic, liberal Middle East, you cannot maintain relationships with dictators”.
Participant C made a similar request. “Support Arab liberals. Support them broadly.
Enable them to have the resources to create the civil society networks to compete with
Islamists (violent). Liberal not in the American sense, it could mean Sufis, nonviolent
Islamists.” Participant E stated the opinion that “helping governments financially should
be linked to democracy and transparency building,” and repeatedly implied throughout
his interview that many of United States efforts in the region have been, intentionally or
not, quite to the contrary.

Conclusion:
Clearly, the task of balancing security concerns with human rights presents
“serious practical challenges for [all] States” (OHCHR 22). However, counter-terrorism
efforts that bypass international and domestic laws safeguarding human rights are
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ultimately self-sabotaging. As Participant E noted, in the case of Morocco “those
[innocent] people were sent to jail with organized fundamentalists and then, after the fact,
real radicalization occurred”. If terrorism has emerged onto the international stage as the
effect of numerous inequalities and injustices embedded in economic and social
structures around the world, the most effective, sustainable, and far-reaching counterstrategies require an approach that emphasizes social justice ad human rights rather than
securitization and criminalization.
There are several lenses of analysis that remain under-researched and deserve
further attention, such as links between patriarchy, militarism, and violence 5 . A critical,
gendered framework of investigation could reveal much about the gender and sexual
politics that facilitate radicalization and terrorism. The way that ideas of male ownership
over female “honor” and “sexuality” are often instrumentalized both by repressive
(predominantly male) state forces and (predominantly male) terrorist radicals alike in
threats of violence, during sessions of torture, and in manifesto literature, demonstrate the
need for a more interdisciplinary approach towards studies of terrorism and violence.
This question could also be extended to examine the presumed gender of the normative
subject in human rights discourse and the potential drawbacks of gender-neutral
language.
Ultimately, the strongest international bodies and most powerful nations in the
world have yet to fully commit to upholding human rights as unassailable rights when
weighing matters of national and international security. For example, within the U.N.,

5

See: Moghadam, Valentine (2002) “Violence and Terrorism: Feminist Observations on
Islamist Movements, State, and the International System” Comparative Studies of South
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East 21(1&2): 125-131.
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“Although the CTC 6 has unequalled power to compel governments to explain their
actions and has set up a mandatory counter-terrorism reporting system for all UN
member states, that reporting system currently includes no human rights component”
(HRW Evil 3). While it is one of the most powerful countries in the world, “the image of
the United States is [that of] a state that promotes violence” (Participant E). “Now people
say, “look at the US, look at what they’ve done to human rights, they’re worse than our
dictatorships”… but “the US still could be a model for human rights [as it once was]”
(Participant B). While the Moroccan state should by no means be exempted from their
own responsibility to uphold these norms and address the internal conditions that foster
terrorism, my participants stressed the belief that if the United States takes a more active
and uncompromising stance in the defense of human rights “this will send a big message
all over the world” (Participant E). I will conclude this article with another thought from
Participant E:
“I hope people loving peace and solidarity promote ideas of tolerance and dialogue…
instead of promoting security. And it’s possible. I really believe that.”
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